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can be used to challenge provisions in the Copyright Act.Introduction 
5 Part IV will evaluate whether amendments to the Cop-
yright Act granting protection to TPMs are consistent single click of a mouse from a personal computer
with the freedom of expression guarantee (s. 2(b)) in thecan create a perfect copy of a digital work. In aA
Charter. Part V will investigate the treaty implications offraction of a second, this work can be disseminated
protecting a right to access works for fair dealing pur-throughout global networks to countless recipients. With
poses within legislation granting protection to TPMs.each click, individuals have the opportunity to broadcast
their ideas and expressions throughout the intercon- This paper concludes that should the Canadian gov-
nected digital world; each click can also be a lost sale for ernment amend the Copyright Act to provide legislative
a copyright owner. In response to the concerns of copy- protection for TPMs, it must create a corresponding right
right owners regarding the threat of digital technologies for users to access copyright-protected expression for fair
to their exclusive rights, some governments have granted dealing purposes. Otherwise, the provisions may not sur-
legislative protection to technological protection mecha- vive Charter scrutiny. Although this paper will discuss
nisms (TPMs). TPMs act as a virtual lock on digital works, this topic with reference to Canada, materials will be
preventing unauthorized access and giving copyright used from other jurisdictions in building this discussion.
owners an unprecedented degree of control over digital As well, the general argument in this paper may be
content. 1 On 20 June, 2005, the Canadian government helpful in addressing the interplay between copyright,
tabled Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act. 2 fair dealing, and freedom of expression rights in other
Among other copyright reforms, Bill C-60 proposes legis- jurisdictions.
lative protection for TPMs.
TPMs preclude unauthorized uses of copyright-pro-
tected works. Not all unauthorized uses, however, are Part I: Technological Protectioninfringing. Copyright law’s fair dealing defence provides Measures that in certain circumstances, the unauthorized use of
another’s copyright-protected expression will not consti-
tute copyright infringement. However, as ‘‘state of the art What is a TPM? 
TPMs are still unable to distinguish between infringing
 TPM is a ‘‘technological method intended to pro-and non-infringing uses’’, 3 TPMs have the effect of
mote the authorized use of digital works’’. 6 ItArestricting both infringing and non-infringing uses of
accomplishes this by ‘‘controlling access to such works ordigital works. TPMs, by locking out all unauthorized
various uses of such works, including copying, distribu-users, severely constrain the ability of users to exercise
tion, performance, and display’’. 7 TPMs operate as ‘‘vir-their right to fair dealing.
tual fences’’, 8 giving copyright holders a ‘‘historically
This paper will investigate whether legislation unprecedented degree of control over access to and use
granting protection to TPMs infringes the freedom of of digital content’’. 9 One example of a TPM in use is a
expression (s. 2(b)) guarantee as contained in the Cana- CD protected by copy control technology. The user is
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 4 This paper will allowed to play the CD on certain approved players (for
proceed in five parts. Part I will discuss Bill C-60 and the instance, in a freestanding CD player but not in a car).
legislative protection of TPMs in Canada. Part II will The user is restricted, however, from making a copy of
discuss the effect of TPMs on fair dealing. Part III will the CD or transferring the songs from her CD to her
analyze whether the freedom of expression guarantee computer.


































































180 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
the public situated on those premises. 17 Second, BillThe legislative protection of TPMs in
C-60 amends the civil remedies section of the CopyrightCanada 
Act to entitle rights holders to all remedies that may beIn 1996, the World Intellectual Property Organiza- conferred by law against a person who, for an infringingtion (WIPO) concluded two treaties meant to address a purpose, circumvents, removes, or renders a TPM ineffec-wide array of digital copyright issues: the WIPO Copy- tive or provides a service to do so. 18 The provision in Billright Treaty (WCT )10 and the WIPO Performances and C-60 regarding the definition of copyright infringementPhonograms Treaty (WPPT)11. Both treaties contain pro- in the context of TPMs is narrower than that of thevisions requiring member countries to ‘‘provide ade- Statement. In both Bill C-60 and the Statement, thequate legal protection and effective legal remedies ‘‘infringing purpose’’ approach to copyright infringementagainst the circumvention of effective technological [pro- is adopted. Through this approach, an individualtection] measures’’ (TPMs) used by authors, performers, infringes copyright by circumventing a technologicalor producers of phonograms in connection with the measure only if the circumvention is done for anexercise of their rights under these treaties or the Berne infringing purpose. For instance, it would not be anConvention, and ‘‘that restrict acts which are not author- infringement of the Copyright Act, as amended by Billized by the authors or permitted by law’’. 12 C-60, to circumvent a technological measure for a fair
In 1997, the Government of Canada signed both dealing purpose.
the WCT and WPPT. As of May 2006, however, Canada When Parliament was dissolved on 28 November,has not ratified either treaty. In May 2004, in its Interim 2005, Bill C-60 died on the order table. It is uncertainReport on Copyright Reform, the House of Commons whether the Government of Canada will reintroduceStanding Committee on Canadian Heritage expressed legislation implementing the provisions of the WCT andfrustration and disappointment at ‘‘the numerous delays WPPT. As a signatory to both treaties, Canada has com-that have impeded the implementation’’ of the WCT mitted itself to their ratification. It is not bound to do so.and WPPT, and recommended their immediate ratifica- However, failure to ratify the WCT and WPPT couldtion. 13 Should it choose to ratify the treaties, Canada result in Canada being ‘‘[deprived] of the benefit of recip-must amend its Copyright Act to implement the provi- rocal enforcement of a number of areas covered by thesions of the WCT and WPPT (including the provisions treaties’’. 19 Furthermore, failure to ratify could renderrequiring adequate legal protection for TPMs). Canada subject to trade-related retaliation from trading
On 24 March, 2005, the Government of Canada partners. 20 Lastly, as evidenced in the Standing Com-
issued both its response to the Interim Report and a mittee on Canadian Heritage’s Interim Report, at least
Statement announcing its intention to table legislation one segment of the Canadian government appears dedi-
proposing copyright reforms. 14 Among other reforms, cated to the implementation of the WCT and WPPT.
the proposed legislation would implement the provi-
As a result, it is anticipated that in 2006 the Cana-sions of the WCT and WPPT, thus ratifying both treaties.
dian government will table legislation implementing theIn comparison to the Standing Committee’s Interim
provisions of the WCT and WPPT, specifically thoseReport and its ‘‘broad-brush endorsement of extending
provisions instituting legal protection for TPMs. Ques-legal protection to TPMs’’, the Statement ‘‘recommended
tions remain as to what form these provisions will take:what appeared to be more specific, discrete provisions’’
the sweeping protections of the Interim Report; the spe-relating to TPMs.15 It recommended that:
cific and discrete protections as set out in the Statement
[T]he circumvention, for infringing purposes, of technolog- and Bill C-60; or stronger protections in response to
ical protection measures (TPMs) applied to copyright mate- pressure from the United States of America (U.S.A.) andrial would itself constitute an act of infringement of copy-
other countries. 21right. Copyright would also be infringed by persons who, for
infringing purposes, enable or facilitate circumvention or Any legislative action taken with respect to TPMswho, without authorization, distribute copyright material
must be consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rightsfrom which TPMs have been removed. It would not be legal
and Freedoms. In tabling Bill C-60, the Government ofto circumvent, without authorization, a TPM applied to a
sound recording, notwithstanding the exception for private Canada stated its intention to create a:
copying. 16
Copyright Act that addresses the Internet in a manner that
The proposed legislation referred to in the State- appropriately balances the rights of copyright owners to
control and benefit from the use of their creative works withment came to fruition in Bill C-60. Receiving its first
the needs of users to have reasonable access to thosereading on 20 June, 2005, Bill C-60 addresses a number
works. 22of digital reforms, among them the implementation of
provisions in the WCT and WPPT pertaining to TPMs. Provisions granting users a corresponding right of rea-
Bill C-60 specifically addresses TPMs in two ways. First, it sonable access to copyrighted expression protected by
states that it is copyright infringement to circumvent, for TPMs, however, are noticeably absent from the Interim
an infringing purpose, a TPM applied to a lesson, test, or Report, the Statement, and Bill C-60. In this paper, I
examination used on the premises of an educational maintain that amending the Copyright Act to extend

































































A Step in the Wrong Direction 181
assuring users a right of reasonable access for fair dealing legal works. The Law Society governs the legal profession
purposes, will infringe the Charter guarantee of freedom of Ontario. It maintains a reference library for its mem-
of expression. bers and the judiciary that features free-standing
photocopiers. The Law Society also provides a custom
photocopying service. For a fee,
single copies of library materials required for research,Part II: Fair Dealing 
review, private study, and criticism as well as for use in
court, tribunal, and government proceedings could be pro-
What is fair dealing? vided to patrons of the library. 36
CCH alleged that the Law Society infringed theirhe concept of fair dealing provides that in certain
copyright both by providing free-standing photocopiersT circumstances, the unauthorized use of another’s
and through their custom photocopying service. Thecopyright-protected expression will not constitute copy-
Supreme Court of Canada rejected this contention,right infringement. This defence exists in various forms
holding that the Law Society’s dealings with the plain-in Canada, 23 the United Kingdom (U.K.), 24 Australia, 25
tiffs’ works fell under the fair dealing defence. Discussingand New Zealand.26 A similar concept — termed fair use
the nature of the defence, McLachlin C.J. stated that fair— exists in the U.S.A. 27 In Canada, fair dealing is codified
dealing should be understood as an ‘‘integral part of thein s. 29 of the Copyright Act. Section 29 provides that
Copyright Act’’. 37 In a similar manner, whereas fair‘‘fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study
dealing had been previously portrayed as a limitation ondoes not infringe copyright’’. 28 Section 29.1 states that:
the copyright holder’s exclusive rights, the SupremeFair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review does not
infringe copyright if the following are mentioned: Court of Canada stated that:
(a) the source; and The fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the Cop-
yright Act, is a user’s right. In order to maintain the proper(b) if given in the source, the name of the
balance between the rights of a copyright owner and users’(i) author, in the case of a work,
interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively. As Professor
(ii) . . . 29 Vaver . . . has explained . . . : ‘‘User rights are not just loop-
holes. Both owner rights and user rights should therefore beAs well, section 29.2 of the Copyright Act states that:
given the fair and balanced reading that befits remedial
Fair dealing for the purpose of news reporting does not legislation.’’ 38
infringe copyright if the following are mentioned:
In Théberge v. Galérie d’Art du Petit Champlain, the(a) the source; and
Supreme Court of Canada, in discussing the competing(b) if given in the source, the name of the
goals of the Copyright Act, expanded upon the concept(i) author, in the case of a work,
of ‘‘proper balance’’:
(ii) . . . 30
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between
The term ‘‘fair dealing’’ is not defined in the Copy- promoting the public interest in the encouragement and
right Act. The question of whether something is ‘‘fair’’ dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and
obtaining a just reward for the creator . . . The proper bal-depends on the facts of each case. 31 The Supreme Court
ance among these and other public policy objectives lies notof Canada has set out a list of factors to provide a ‘‘useful
only in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving dueanalytical framework [governing] determinations of fair- weight to their limited nature. In interpreting the Copyright
ness in future cases’’. 32 In assessing whether ‘‘fairness’’ has Act, courts should strive to maintain an appropriate balance
been established, triers of fact should consider: (1) the between these two goals. 39
purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; As mentioned, fair dealing plays a crucial role in helping
(3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives to the maintain the balance between the public interest and
dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of creator’s rights. It does so by allowing individuals to
the dealing on the work. 33 access, use, and build fairly upon the creator’s copy-
For many years, fair dealing was ‘‘all but redundant righted expression for certain purposes. In Canada, these
in the Canadian courts: rarely raised and cursorily purposes are those which fall within the categories of
rejected’’. 34 However, two recent Supreme Court of research, private study, criticism, review, and news
Canada decisions have indicated a shift in the Court’s reporting.
perception of the importance of fair dealing in the con-
text of the Canadian Copyright Act. This shift has
The effect of legislative protection ofresulted both from the Court’s recognition that the Cop-
TPMs on fair dealing yright Act has as its goal the establishment of a balance
between creators and the public interest, and its The equivalent of a virtual lock on digital works,
acknowledgement that fair dealing plays an integral role TPMs allow copyright holders to exclude unauthorized
in maintaining this balance. access and use. Due to technological constraints, how-
The leading Canadian case on fair dealing is CCH ever, TPMs are ‘‘unable to distinguish between infringing
Canadian Limited. v. Law Society of Upper Canada. 35 and non-infringing uses of digital works’’. 40 Thus, though

































































182 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
thorized infringing uses (such as duplication for resale), Kerr defines circumvention of a TPM as ‘‘the
they would also have the effect of excluding unautho- breaking or avoidance of the use of a protection mea-
rized uses which are non-infringing (such as those uses sure’’. 44 Both the Statement and Bill C-60 would only
that fall within the fair dealing defence). 41 impose liability if a TPM is circumvented for an
infringing purpose. Thus, under the proposed CanadianLocked out by TPMs, individuals seeking to access
legislation, it would be legal for users to circumventcopyright-protected expression for fair dealing purposes
TPMs to exercise their user rights. However, resorting tohave three options. First, they could use a non-TPM pro-
circumventing TPMs in order to exercise one’s usertected copy of the work (either a print copy or a digital
rights has three distinct disadvantages. First, this optioncopy without a TPM). Second, they could seek a licence
imposes a technological barrier on users. As Bailey states:from the copyright holder to use the work. Third, they
[I]f exercising users’ rights means, for example, developing orcould attempt to circumvent the TPM in order to access
implementing decryption programs to circumvent over-the copyright-protected expression. The success of the
broad TPMs, those without superior computer knowledgefirst option is dependent on the existence and accessi- and programming skills (i.e., most citizens) will be ‘‘locked
bility of non-TPM protected copies of the work. Given out’’. Most of us will be particularly dependent on those
with superior skills to develop and distribute the technologythat rights owners in the digital context are increasingly
necessary to exercise our rights. 45turning to the use of TPMs ‘‘to enforce and protect their
rights and to aid in the dissemination of their works’’, 42 it Second, the act of circumventing the TPM could impose
is reasonable to expect that the availability of non-TPM a cost barrier on users. If users are unable to acquire
protected digital copies of a work will decrease. Further- circumvention technology themselves (either through
more, given the rapid spread of digital technologies, the development or discovery), they would be forced to
low cost of producing digital copies, and the ease in their purchase or licence circumvention technology from pro-
dissemination, it is reasonable to expect that the availa- grammers. Third, forcing individuals to circumvent
bility of print copies of a work may decrease in future TPMs in order to access a work for fair dealing purposes
years. For instance, companies may decide to release undermines the nature of fair dealing as a user right, as
books through the Internet rather than in print editions. established by the Supreme Court of Canada in CCH. 46
Thus, individuals wishing to access non-TPM-protected Individuals who circumvent TPMs in order to acquire
copies of a certain work would be forced to invest both copyright-protected expression are forced to act in a
time and money in tracking down elusive print copies or manner suggestive of criminal behaviour. Acting in such
non-TPM-protected digital copies. Lacking these a manner is not compatible with the exercise of a right.
resources, or simply unable to secure a non-TPM-pro- Kerr states that ‘‘circumvention of a TPM put in place by
tected copy, individuals would be compelled either to a copyright owner to control a digital work subject to
seek a licence from the copyright holder or circumvent copyright has been described by some as the electronic
the TPM. equivalent of breaking and entering into a locked room
in order to obtain a copy of a work, such as a book’’. 47The second option for individuals seeking to bypass
Kerr highlights a variety of circumvention techniques,a TPM to access a copyright-protected work for fair
many of which suggest acts of theft, including inter-dealing purposes involves acquiring a licence for its use
cepting decrypted content; brute-force decryption;from the copyright holder. However, individuals are not
stealing the key during transmission; hacking closed sys-legally required to seek licences for works in order to use
tems; and pirated plug- ins. 48them for fair dealing purposes. The fair dealing defence
allows users to access and use works without first TPMs limit the ability of individuals to exercise
receiving the copyright holder’s authorization. Moreover, their user rights to fair dealing. Their presence could
if the copyright holder levies a fee for its licence, then ‘‘effectively write [fair dealing] out of copyright law,
this option would impose a cost barrier to access that thereby creating information monopolies’’. 49 In this
would not ordinarily exist. This cost barrier could deter paper, I maintain the position that the legislative protec-
individuals who do not have the financial means to tion of TPMs infringes the freedom of expression guar-
acquire a licence. There is also a risk that some copyright antee in s. 2(b) of the Charter. This position presupposes
holders would refuse to licence their work at any price if that Bill C-60 may be challenged on a s. 2(b) basis. This
it is to be used for certain fair dealing uses (namely those presupposition will be explored in the following section.
that critique the original work or place it in a less-than-
flattering light). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has stated that the:
Part III: Is Copyright Legislationunlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license
critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions Subject to Freedom of Expression
removes such uses from the very notion of a potential Scrutiny? licensing market. 43
Lacking financial resources or facing the copyright he issue of whether amendments to the Copyright
holder’s refusal to licence the work, users may be forced T Act granting legislative protection to TPMs might

































































A Step in the Wrong Direction 183
requires close examination. The Copyright Act prohibits copyrighted expression, fair dealing for the purposes of
individuals from expressing their views using the copy- research or private study encourages textual interaction
right-protected expression of others in ways that infringe and personal reflection, helping individuals develop and
the copyright holder’s exclusive rights. Consequently, challenge their beliefs by weighing them against the
claimants have asserted that the Copyright Act violates expressed beliefs of others. Through reproducing the
their right to freedom of expression. 50 However, argu- expression of others, individuals can become better
ments made on this basis have traditionally been unsuc- informed. Access without reproduction may not be suffi-
cessful, as courts have been reluctant to apply a freedom cient. In some situations, individuals may not be able to
of expression analysis to copyright laws. 51 This section remain in close enough proximity to the original work
will explore the rationale underlying the courts’ reluc- in order to make use of it. In other situations, the work
tance in this regard. It will also demonstrate that this may be in such demand that individuals must be per-
rationale does not apply in the context of TPMs. This mitted to reproduce it in order to become better
section will show that, in the context of TPMs, it is informed. A better informed polity contributes to a rich
appropriate to apply an external freedom of expression democracy, in which a multiplicity of views can emerge.
analysis to copyright law. It can also advance the search for truth and communal
exchange of ideas. Research and private study also pro-
mote the value of self-fulfillment, in that they ‘‘[provide]Rationale underlying the courts’
the ingredients for cultivation of knowledge, self-devel-reluctance: internal balance 
opment and informed individual participation in a com-
The rationale underlying the courts’ reluctance to munity’s affairs’’. 56 The ability to reproduce copies of
apply freedom of expression to copyright law is the belief paintings, written works, and songs (among other forms
that freedom of expression concerns are satisfied within of expression) in furtherance of research or private study
copyright law. 52 Copyright law is believed to satisfy purposes allows individuals to challenge themselves
freedom of expression concerns through various internal intellectually, achieving self-actualization in the areas
mechanisms, including the idea/expression dichotomy; that interest them most.
the time-limited nature of copyright; the substantial
Fair dealing for the purposes of criticism, review, ortaking requirement, and the fair dealing defence. 53 Fair
news reporting allows individuals to respond to the cop-dealing is the only internal mechanism that allows users
yright-protected expression of others and disseminateto express themselves using a substantial amount of
the results of their personal reflection with a broaderunauthorized copyright-protected expression during the
audience. It allows individuals to test the multiplicity ofperiod of copyright. Thus, it is the internal mechanism
views created through research and private study. Bymost affected by TPMs. In attempting to describe the
‘‘facilitating the ventilation of divergent . . . ideas’’, theimpact of TPMs on freedom of expression, this section of
criticism, review or reporting of copyright-protectedthe paper will proceed by examining the relationship
expression aids the democratic process. 57 Fair dealingbetween fair dealing and freedom of expression.
helps create a vibrant dialogue, which can both engage aCourts have not expressly indicated how the fair
democratic polity in political thought and action anddealing defence protects freedom of expression concerns
advance the search for truth. In attempting to discover orwithin copyright law. The Supreme Court of Canada has
confirm ‘‘truth’’, it is essential that individuals are per-held that the core values underlying the protection of
mitted to quote from the expression of others. Levalfreedom of expression can be summarized as follows:
notes that:(1) seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently
good activity; important areas of intellectual activity are explicitly referen-
tial. Philosophy, criticism, history, and even the natural sci-(2) participation in social and political decision-making
ences require continuous reexamination of yesterday’sis to be fostered and encouraged; and
theses. 58(3) the diversity in forms of individual self-fulfillment
and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in an Such a reexamination would be imprecise and ineffi-
essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environ- cient if individuals were not permitted to use the expres-ment not only for the sake of those who convey a
sion of others. For instance, a critique of the accuracy of ameaning, but also for the sake of those to whom it
is conveyed. 54 historical text will be much more precise if individuals
are permitted to cite specific passages with which theyFair dealing promotes these same values. It does so by
disagree.protecting certain categories of works which themselves
promote the core values of freedom of expression. In the ways described above, the fair dealing
There are five categories of works within the Cana- defence promotes the core values of freedom of expres-
dian fair dealing defence: research, private study; criti- sion. In this regard, freedom of expression concerns are
cism; review; and news reporting. 55 These categories of addressed to some extent within the Copyright Act.
works promote participation in democratic dialogue, the Courts seem to have relied upon the existence of fair
search for truth and communal exchange of ideas, and dealing as grounds for not applying an external freedom
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challenged on the grounds that the existence of a fair Michelin aside, Canadian cases have not discussed
dealing defence does not necessarily ensure that ade- the circumstances in which courts should permit an
quate protection is given to freedom of expression con- external application of a freedom of expression analysis
cerns. to copyright laws. 61 As a result, in order to determine
when a s. 2(b) analysis should be applied to the Copy-In order to determine whether adequate protection
right Act, this paper will consider decisions from otheris given to freedom of expression concerns within copy-
jurisdictions. The United States Supreme Court has indi-right legislation, one must examine the scope of fair
cated that copyright legislation may be subject to Firstdealing protection. The scope of fair dealing protection is
Amendment scrutiny in situations where Congress hasdetermined by the balance which is struck within copy-
altered the ‘‘traditional contours of copyright protec-right legislation between freedom of expression concerns
tion’’. 62 This principle was established in Eldred v. Ash-and the property interests of copyright holders. As noted
croft. 63 In this case, the plaintiff asked the United Statesin Théberge, the Canadian Copyright Act seeks both to
Supreme Court to declare the Copyright Term Exten-promote the public interest and adequately compensate
sion Act of 1998 (CTEA) unconstitutional. 64 The CTEAauthors. 59 This balance varies from jurisdiction to juris-
extended the duration of copyright protection from ‘‘lifediction. It is questionable whether the Canadian concep-
plus fifty’’ to ‘‘life plus seventy’’ years. 65 In dismissing thetion of fair dealing balances these competing interests in
case, the Supreme Court stated that in situations whensuch a way as to adequately protect freedom of expres-
‘‘Congress has not altered the traditional contours ofsion concerns. This question is especially pertinent with
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutinyrespect to parody. The fair use defence in United States
is unnecessary’’. 66 Significantly, however, the Supremejurisprudence, as it pertains to parody, is much broader
Court refused to adopt the position of the D.C. Circuitthan the defence in either Canada or the U.K. A detailed
Court of Appeal, which had stated that copyright is ‘‘cat-examination of this issue, however, is beyond the scope
egorically immune from challenges under the Firstof this paper. For the purposes of this paper, it will be
Amendment’’. 67 It should be noted that the Court inassumed that freedom of expression concerns are, for the
Eldred does not define the ‘‘traditional contours of copy-most part, appropriately satisfied within the Canadian
right protection’’. 68 Given the vagueness of this principle,fair dealing defence.
this decision does little to clarify the circumstances in
which a freedom of expression analysis should be
applied to copyright. 69
Overcoming the courts’ reluctance to
apply an external freedom of expression The UK Court of Appeal has indicated in Ashdown
analysis v. Telegraph Group that in the majority of cases, the
‘‘express exceptions to be found in the Act’’ will satisfyCanadian courts have not foreclosed the possibility
freedom of expression concerns. 70 However, in some cir-that freedom of expression could constrain the Copy-
cumstances, the ‘‘right of freedom of expression willright Act. In both The Queen v. James Lorimer & Co.
come into conflict with the protection afforded by theLtd., a case involving the infringement of a literary work
Copyright Act’’. The Court in Ashdown indicated thatentitled Canada’s Oil Monopoly, and Canadian Tire
these circumstances will be rare. However, besides theCorp. Ltd. v. Retail Clerks Union, a case involving the
fact that these circumstances are ‘‘rare’’, it does not tell usmodification of the Canadian Tire logo by the Retail
when they will occur. Thus, like the approach of the U.S.Clerks Union, the courts have stated that there ‘‘may be
Supreme Court in Eldred, the approach of the U.K.situations where the guarantee of freedom of expression
Court of Appeal in Ashdown gives little guidance within para. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
respect to the question of when s. 2(b) can be applied toFreedoms may properly limit the protection otherwise
challenge legislation granting protection to TPMs.given to the owners of copyright’’. 60
While leaving open the possibility that freedom of
expression could constrain copyright, however, Cana- As decisions from other jurisdictions offer little gui-
dian courts have tended to dismiss freedom of expres- dance in this regard, this paper will attempt to set out an
sion claims in copyright infringement cases cursorily. approach for determining when courts can apply
Both the abridgment of the Canada’s Oil Monopoly text freedom of expression to copyright legislation. This
and the modified Canadian Tire logo were quickly approach is consistent with the courts’ rationale under-
deemed to be situations in which the infringer’s freedom lying their reluctance to apply freedom of expression in
of expression was not violated. The most recent Cana- the first instance. As stated above, courts have tradition-
dian case to address the confluence between copyright ally refrained from applying a freedom of expression
and freedom of expression, Cie Génerale des Etablisse- analysis to copyright because of the assumption that the
ments Michelin–Michelin & Cie v. CAW-Canada et al. core values of freedom of expression are satisfied within
(Michelin), does so in more detail. However, as it is open copyright law through internal mechanisms such as fair
to criticism on various grounds, it will be addressed sepa- dealing. I maintain the position that where copyright

































































A Step in the Wrong Direction 185
freedom of expression concerns, courts should refrain This provision lessens the negative impact of TPMs on
from applying a freedom of expression analysis. To do so user rights such as fair dealing. Given that fair dealing
would be to consider freedom of expression concerns protects the core values of freedom of expression,
twice. However, courts should allow the freedom of Article 6(4) also diminishes the negative impact of TPMs
expression guarantee to challenge the Copyright Act in on users’ rights to freedom of expression. The existence
situations where the values underlying freedom of of this provision in the ISD demonstrates the EC’s con-
expression are not satisfied within copyright law.71 cern with the encroachment of TPMs upon user rights. It
also highlights the potential danger to the rights of usersAs stated above, the introduction of legislative provi-
absent any protection for their interests in Canadiansions granting protection to TPMs effectively locks out
legislation.users seeking to use another individual’s copyright-pro-
tected expression for fair dealing purposes. Fair dealing is An illustration of how Article 6(4) protects user
effectively precluded; the protection afforded to freedom rights from TPMs is found in Christophe R., UFC Que
of expression concerns within copyright law is effectively Choisir v. Warner Music, a case decided by the Tribunal
eliminated. Consequently, the rationale for excluding an de Grande Instance in France. 75 After buying the CD
external freedom of expression analysis is no longer ‘‘Testify’’ by Phil Collins, Christophe R. discovered ‘‘that
valid. Based on the approach delineated above, it is there- he could not play it on his laptop nor could he make
fore appropriate to apply a s. 2(b) analysis to legislation copies from the CD’’. 76 Christophe R. was unable to
granting protection to TPMs. perform these tasks due to a TPM which was encoded
on the CD. He argued that the legislation granting pro-
tection to TPMs conflicted with his ‘‘right to private
copying’’. 77 As noted by Helberger, based on its interpre-Part IV: The Constitutionality of tation of Article 6(4) of the ISD, the Tribunal concluded
Legislation Granting Protection to that TPMs must ‘‘respect certain exceptions, including
TPMs the private copying exception’’. 78 In criticizing the scope
of TPMs, the Tribunal noted that:n Part III, it was determined that amendments to the
the application of anti-copying protection devices by phono-I Copyright Act granting protection to TPMs ought to
gram producers causes the statutory limitations of thebe subject to Charter scrutiny. Part IV will subject these
authors’ exclusive rights to authorise or prohibit reproduc-amendments to Charter scrutiny. In this paper, I main- tions to fade. 79
tain that legislation granting protection to TPMs
The Tribunal went on to state that ‘‘it is the task of theinfringes s. 2(b) of the Charter by restricting the ability of
DRM user, here: the phonogram producer, to make sureusers to access works for fair dealing purposes. As Canada
that private copying remains possible, despite the appli-has not yet passed legislation protecting TPMs, there are
cation of technological protection measures’’. 80no Canadian cases that deal with its constitutionality.
Thus, in applying s. 2(b) in the context of TPMs, this part It has been suggested that protection for user rightswill begin by examining cases and commentary from may extend beyond that provided by Article 6(4) of theother jurisdictions in which legislation protecting TPMs ISD.81 Patricia Akester indicates that the encroachmenthas been enacted. Informed by these works, this paper of TPMs on user rights may also infringe a user’s freedomwill proceed with a s. 2(b) analysis of legislation granting of expression rights. She states that freedom of expres-protection to TPMs. sion may be infringed where certain user rights are
denied
International decisions because rightholders fail to provide [users] with appropriate
means of doing so, especially where they fail to assure thatThe European Community implemented the provi- users are able to take advantage of exceptions that fallsions of the WCT and WPPT in Directive 2001/29/EC within the core freedoms. 82
of the European Parliament (the Information Society
Akester identifies exceptions granting individuals ‘‘accessDirective). 72 Article 6 of this directive addresses the obli-
to political, artistic, literary or journalistic speech’’ asgations of Member States as to technological measures. 73
those falling within the core freedoms, citing, as anUnlike the proposed amendments to the Copyright Act
example, an instance where a music teacher is unable tocontained in both the Statement and Bill C-60, the Infor-
make a copy of a sound recording in the context ofmation Society Directive (ISD) includes a provision
teaching. 83which protects exceptions to copyright infringement
(such as the fair dealing defence) from encroachment by Applied in the Canadian context, Akester’s view sug-
TPMs. Article 6(4) of the ISD states that: gests that a constitutional breach may occur where users
[I]n the absence of voluntary measures taken by right- are denied the opportunity to take advantage of excep-
holders . . . Member states shall take appropriate measures to tions granting individuals access to political, artistic, lit-ensure that right-holders make available to the beneficiary
erary, or journalistic speech. One such exception is theof an exception or limitation . . . the means of benefiting
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of this paper that instituting legislative protection for burden the fair use rights of users of the copyright mate-
TPMs without providing a corresponding right of access rial’’. 92
to users for fair dealing purposes infringes the s. 2(b) 321 Studios is a company that ‘‘markets and sellsguarantee. software and instructions for copying DVDs’’. 93 It sells
The U.S.A. takes a different approach than that of two products that allow the user to ‘‘copy video content
the E.C. to the legislative protection of TPMs. Enacted in from original DVDs regardless of whether they are
1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) encoded’’ with copy control technology. 94 321 Studios
implements the WCT and WPPT into United States filed a complaint for declaratory relief seeking, among
law.84 It contains two provisions that address the circum- other relief, a declaratory judgment stating that the pro-
vention of TPMs. Section 1201(a)(1)(A) of the DMCA visions of the DMCA that give legislative protection to
prohibits individuals from circumventing technological TPMs violate the First Amendment.
measures that control access to a copyright-protected
In her decision, Illston J. concluded that the provi-work. 85 Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits the manufacture or
sions of the DMCA that deal with TPMs do not imper-trafficking of any technology, service, or device that is
missibly burden the fair use rights of users. In reachingprimarily designed to circumvent TPMs. 86 It is no
this decision, Illston J. rejected the ‘‘plaintiff’s claim thatdefence to a f inding of  infr ingement under
such users have a First Amendment right to make fairs. 1201(a)(1)(A) to argue that the circumvention was done
use of copyrighted works based on Eldred v. Ashcroft’’. 95for a fair use purpose. Under the DMCA, the ‘‘down-
Illston J.’s decision can be criticized on various grounds.stream uses of the software . . . whether legal or illegal, are
First, Illston J.’s position that the burdens imposed by thenot relevant to determining whether [one has violated]
DMCA do not ‘‘unconstitutionally impinge fair usethe statute’’. 87 The DMCA differs in this regard from Bill
rights’’ is based in large part on her contention that usersC-60, which, as noted above, adopts the ‘‘infringing pur-
can access TPM-protected content in other ways suffi-pose’’ approach. While it would not be an infringement
cient for fair use purposes. As Illston J. states, ‘‘fair use isof the Copyright Act, as amended by Bill C-60, to cir-
still possible under the DMCA, although such copyingcumvent a technological measure for a fair dealing pur-
will not be as easy, as exact, or as digitally manipulable aspose, it would be an infringement of the DMCA to
plaintiff desires’’. 96 This paper takes the position that thiscircumvent a technological measure for a fair dealing
contention is not always valid. Illston J. cites the analysispurpose.
in Corley in support of her position, in which the court
Though the DMCA contains no provision compa- states that:
rable to Article 6(4) of the ISD, some protection is offered
We know of no authority for the proposition that fair use, asfor users’ fair dealing rights. Section 1201(c)(1) states that
protected by the Copyright Act, much less the Constitution,‘‘nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limi- guarantees copying by the optimum method or in the iden-
tations, or defences to copyright infringement, including tical format of the original . . . The fact that the resulting
copy will not be as perfect or as manipulable as a digitalfair use, under this title’’. 88 It has been suggested that this
copy obtained by having direct access to the DVD movie insection could be used to help preserve users’ rights to
its digital form, provides no basis for a claim of unconstitu-access works for fair dealing purposes under the DMCA. tional limitation of fair use. 97
In Universal City Studios Inc. v. Corley , the defendants
The content in question may not be available in anycontended that s. 1201(c)(1) ‘‘can be read to allow the
form other than that protected by the technologicalcircumvention of encryption technology protecting
measure. Illston J. herself acknowledges that ‘‘not all con-copyrighted material when the material will be put to
tent on DVDs may be available in other forms’’. 98 As a‘fair uses’ exempt from copyright liability’’. 89 This con-
result, users could be forced into a position where theytention was rejected by Newman J. for the Court in
must either circumvent the technological measure orCorley, who stated that s. 1201(c)(1) does not permit
take alternate measures to use the TPM-protected con-such a reading. Instead, Newman J. takes the position
tent. The nature of such alternate measures, and theirthat s. 1201(c)(1):
level of effectiveness, varies depending on the mediumsimply clarifies that the DMCA targets the circumvention of
and the level of technological protection. For instance, ifdigital walls guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking
tools) . . . [it] does not concern itself with the use of those the sole copy of a photograph is contained on a DVD
materials after circumvention has occurred. 90 protected by a technological measure, the critic seeking
More important for the purposes of this paper is the to use the photograph for a fair dealing purpose, if con-
position of American courts with respect to the question strained from accessing the photograph through circum-
of whether the burden placed on the fair use rights of vention of the technological measure, may have to use a
users by the DMCA constitutes a violation of users’ First camera to take a picture of the photograph as it is dis-
Amendment rights. This issue was addressed by the played on a computer monitor. Such a picture would, in
United States District Court for the Northern District of all probability, be of lower quality than the original, and
California in 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc. 91 In 321 may be of such poor quality that the fair use purpose is
Studios, Illston J. concluded that the anti-circumvention frustrated. Given the varying efficacy of alternate mea-

































































A Step in the Wrong Direction 187
tion of Illston J., the alternate methods through which opposed to requires) give the reader the impression that
users can access TPM-protected content are not sufficient the user, though slightly inconvenienced, is still able to
for fair use purposes. accomplish his or her fair dealing purpose. Furthermore,
the use of the word ‘‘desires’’ (as opposed to requires) Second, Illston J. conflates different forms of con-
could give the reader the impression that the user is antent in order to support her argument that users can,
individual who chooses to use the technologically-pro-without much difficulty, find ways to make fair use of
tected content, and not one who needs the contentthe content without having to circumvent a technolog-
locked up by the technological measure for a fair useical measure. In building her argument, Illston J. uses a
purpose. While the fact that the resulting copy will notquote from United States v. Elcom Ltd., in which the
be as perfect as a digital copy may provide no basis for acourt stated that ‘‘the fair user may find it more difficult
claim of unconstitutional limitation of fair use, the factto engage in certain fair uses with regard to electronic
that the resulting copy may be so shoddy as to bebooks, but nevertheless, fair use is still available’’. 99 In this
unusable for a fair use purpose may provide a basis for asituation, the user, constrained by a technological mea-
claim of unconstitutional limitation of fair use. In such asure (for instance a read-only copy of a text), is denied
case, fair use may not be deemed to be ‘‘available’’, asthe ability to digitally copy and paste large swathes of
TPM-imposed barriers may effectively preclude userstext for a fair use purpose. However, the user can,
from exercising their right to fair dealing. In this situa-without much difficulty, write out the text by hand or
tion, Eldred may mandate the application of the Firstwork with a second computer to type out the text. In the
Amendment to the anti-circumvention provisions of theexample given in Elcom , fair use is made more difficult
DMCA, as copyright’s built-in safeguards may not beby technological measures. Nevertheless, the user is still
adequate to resolve First Amendment concerns. 102able to access and copy the work relatively easily,
Fourth, Illston J.’s judgment, by minimizing thewithout a loss of quality. As a result, the balance of
impact of the burden placed on the fair dealing rights ofconvenience may fall on the side of the copyright owner,
users, adopts a restrictive view of fair use and users’ rights.which could justify the presence of the anti-circumven-
This restrictive view is inconsistent with the approachtion provisions. Illston J.’s argument becomes much
taken in American jurisprudence, as illustrated by themore tenuous when one envisions the content in ques-
broad view of fair use taken in Campbell v. Acuff-Rosetion as film or photographs, rather than text. In film, the
by the United States Supreme Court. 103 Similarly, Illstondialogue can be copied by hand without much difficulty.
J.’s restrictive view of fair use is inconsistent with theCopying a video without access to the DVD itself, how-
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in CCH Canadian,ever, is much more difficult. One option could be for the
in which fair dealing was characterized broadly as auser to use a personal video recorder to film the content
user’s right. 104 Given these possible criticisms of Illston J.’srequired for the fair use purpose as it appears on the
decision, this paper takes the position that further judi-screen (in view-only format). However, the quality of this
cial support for Illston J.’s position is needed if it is torecording could be very poor. Similar problems are
influence the development of Canadian law in this area.posed by photography, as noted above. In dealing with
film and photography, the balance of convenience may
fall on the side of the user seeking to exercise their fair Canada dealing rights, as opposed to the copyright owner. Illston
J. does not address the difficulties posed by video and
film, despite the fact that 321 Studios is a case which Section 2(b) analysis 
deals with the copying of DVDs and not electronic Informed by cases and commentary from the E.C.
books. and the U.S.A., this paper will proceed by subjecting
 Third, Illston J. minimizes the difficulties noted legislation protecting TPMs to a s. 2(b) analysis. As noted
above through her choice of diction. Through the course in Part I, Bill C-60 died when the Parliament of Canada
of the decision, Illston J. uses phrases that create the was dissolved. The form which future Canadian legisla-
impression that users who are denied the opportunity to tion protecting TPMs will take is uncertain. As a result,
circumvent technological measures to access protected the ‘‘legislation’’ which this paper will subject to a s. 2(b)
content for fair dealing purposes experience only a small analysis will consist of an amalgam of the Statement and
inconvenience. In reality, their fair use purpose may be Bill C-60. The Statement reflects the Government of
completely frustrated. Illston J. cites a passage in Corley Canada’s broad vision for the statute; Bill C-60 reflects
which states that ‘‘the fact that the resulting copy will not the first attempt to enact such a statute. Consistent with
be as perfect or as manipulable as a digital copy . . . the Statement and Bill C-60, the legislation for the pur-
provides no basis for a claim of unconstitutional limita- poses of the s. 2(b) analysis will contain a provision
tion of fair use’’. 100 In addition, Illston J. states that ‘‘fair stating that the circumvention, for infringing purposes, of
use is still possible under the DMCA, although such TPMs applied to copyright material will itself constitute
copying will not be as easy, as exact, or as digitally an act of infringement of copyright. 105 Furthermore, also
manipulable as plaintiff desires’’. 101 The use of the words consistent with the Statement and Bill C-60, the legisla-
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provision granting users a right to access TPM-protected Teitelbaum J. concluded that ‘‘the Charter does not
expression for fair dealing purposes. confer the right to use private property — the Plaintiff’s
copyright — in the service of freedom of expression’’. 115
The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that a He expanded upon this statement by noting that:
s. 2(b) claim proceeds in two steps. First, it must be
[A] person using the private property of another like a copy-determined whether the defendant’s activity is within
right, must demonstrate that his or her use of the property isthe sphere of conduct protected by freedom of expres- compatible with the function of the property before the
sion. This step asks both whether the activity can be Court can deem the use a protected form of expression
considered ‘‘expression’’ and whether there are any spe- under the Charter. 116
cial circumstances that warrant removing that activity If the defendant cannot demonstrate this compatibility,from the protected sphere of freedom of expression. then the activity will be deemed a prohibited form ofSecond, it must be determined whether the government expression. Applying this test to the parodic depiction,action in question restricts this activity in purpose or Teitelbaum J. noted that:effect. 106
In the present case, subjecting the Plaintiff’s ‘‘Bibendum’’ to
The first stage of the s. 2(b) analysis requires that we ridicule as the object of parody is not compatible with the
function of the copyright. A ‘‘Bibendum’’ about to stompdetermine whether the defendant’s activities constitute
hapless workers into submission does not present the orig-‘‘expression’’. The Supreme Court of Canada has stated
inal author’s intent of a favourable corporate image or pro-that an activity is expressive if it attempts to convey vide an incentive for compensating artists for the integrity of
meaning. 107 This definition is ‘‘very broad and inclusive’’ their vision. 117
and should be given a ‘‘generous interpretation’’. 108
Accordingly, Teitelbaum J. concluded that the parodicGiven the courts’ generous interpretation of ‘‘expres-
depiction of ‘‘Bibendum’’ was a prohibited form ofsion’’, fair dealing activities will likely be considered
expression, and was not protected under the sphere of‘‘expression’’ for the purpose of the freedom of expres-
s. 2(b). 118sion analysis. Criticism, review, and news reporting gen-
erally fuse the expression of the user/author with that of The Michelin approach to the s. 2(b) analysis
the copyright holder in the attempt to convey meaning requires users seeking Charter protection for works
to a broader audience. In research and private study, one falling under the fair dealing defence to demonstrate
generally attempts to convey meaning to oneself through that their use of the property is compatible with the
a process of investigation and analysis. function of the property before their use can be deemed
a protected form of expression. Teitelbaum J. defines theNext, it must be determined whether there are any
‘‘function’’ of the property according to the author’s‘‘special circumstances that would warrant removing
interests. In Michelin, he held that the two functions of[activities falling within the fair dealing defence] from
the ‘‘Bibendum’’ were to ‘‘present the original author’sthe protected sphere under the Charter’’. 109 For example,
intent of a favourable corporate image or provide anviolent forms of expression fall outside of the protected
incentive for compensating artists for the integrity ofsphere under s. 2(b). 110 However, ‘‘a form need not be
their vision’’. 119violent in order to be prohibited’’. 111 In Cie Génerale des
Etablissements Michelin–Michelin & Cie v. C.A.W.- Under this approach, many acts of fair dealing
Canada (Michelin), Teitelbaum J. of the Federal Court would fall outside the scope of s. 2(b) protection. For
Trial Division held that acts that involve the use of instance, acts of fair dealing that are critical of the works
another individual’s intellectual property are prima facie from which the underlying copyright-protected expres-
prohibited forms of expression. Acts will be protected sion is drawn would be denied protection on the basis
where the user can demonstrate that they are consistent that they neither present the original author’s intent of a
with the function of the property. favourable image, nor provide incentives for compen-
sating authors. It is likely that even if the parodic depic-In Michelin, the defendant CAW created leaflets tion of ‘‘Bibendum’’ had met the criteria for ‘‘criticism’’which featured the plaintiff’s smiling character in the Copyright Act, it would have been denied protec-‘‘Bibendum’’ (a ‘‘fanciful, happy, marshmallow-like figure tion on the grounds that it presented an unfavourable. . . attired not unlike an astronaut, but with an exposed image of the corporation, contrary to the intent of thecartoon-style of head’’) with its foot raised menacingly original author. Significantly, fair dealing acts which areover an unsuspecting worker. 112 These leaflets were cre- critical of the copyright holder (in this case, a corpora-ated in furtherance of the defendants’ attempts to tion) promote the core values of democratic dialogue‘‘become the bargaining agents for the workforce at three and the search for truth. To deny these forms of fairplants of the plaintiff in Nova Scotia’’. 113 The Bibendum dealing protection under the freedom of expressionwas protected under both copyright and trade mark law. guarantee is to impoverish the guarantee itself.The plaintiff sued under both heads. As part of their
defence, CAW claimed that certain provisions in the Michelin’s approach can be criticized on various
Copyright Act infringed their Charter right to freedom grounds. First, Teitelbaum J.’s analysis in Michelin ‘‘sub-


































































A Step in the Wrong Direction 189
lated in section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982’’. 120 Fourth, Teitelbaum J.’s approach is implicitly
While there is a constitutional right to freedom of rejected in British Columbia Automobile Assn v. Office
expression, there is no constitutional right to property. As and Professional Employees’ International Union, Local
noted by Bailey, ‘‘the existence of any . . . property right is 378 (BCAA). 130 BCAA dealt with a labour dispute in
dependent on the constitutional validity of the legisla- which the Union ‘‘created a web site which was similar
tion purporting to grant it’’. 121 Compelling users to to the Association’s web site in appearance and used the
demonstrate the compatibility of their expression with Association’s trade-marks in its domain name and meta
the intention of the copyright holder ‘‘mistakenly places tags’’. 131 The plaintiff contended that ‘‘the right of
the statutory property cart before the constitutional freedom of expression . . . cannot provide justification for
expression horse’’. 122 appropriating or infringing the plaintiff’s intellectual
property rights’’. 132 This position echoes Teitelbaum J.’s
In addition, Teitelbaum J.’s decision improperly bal- decision. Sigurdson J., however, rejects the plaintiff’s
ances the constitutionally protected right to freedom of claim that the right of freedom of expression cannot
expression of users with the unentrenched property provide justification for appropriating or infringing the
rights of copyright holders. Though neither freedom of plaintiff’s intellectual property rights. Instead, Sigurdson
expression nor intellectual property rights are absolute, J. holds that in determining whether the right of
any balancing that takes place between the two must freedom of expression can justify the appropriation of
occur at the stage of a s. 1 analysis. 123 As Bailey notes, another’s intellectual property, it is necessary to strike a
‘‘there is no principled basis to suggest that economic reasonable balance between the property rights of the
rights should foreclose inclusion of expression within the owner and the freedom of expression rights of the
scope of section 2(b)’’. 124 user. 133
Second, Teitelbaum J.’s characterization of the It is important to note that in his decision,
objective of the Copyright Act is singularly concerned Sigurdson J. did not refer to the aspects of the Michelin
with the rights of the copyright holder. For instance, decision that address the intersection of copyright and
Teitelbaum J. states that the objective of the Copyright freedom of expression. However, Sigurdson J. does dis-
Act is the ‘‘protection of authors and ensuring that they cuss Michelin in the context of the ‘‘ambit of ‘use’ of
are recompensed for their creative energies and works’’. marks in association with wares or services under Sec-
This statement is inconsistent with the Supreme Court tion 20 and Section 22 of the Trade-marks Act’’. 134 This
of Canada’s characterization of the objective of the Copy- indicates that Sigurdson J. was aware of the Michelin
right Act as attempting to create a ‘‘balance between decision. In establishing his own ‘‘balancing rights’’
promoting the public interest in the encouragement and approach, Sigurdson J. implicitly rejects Teitelbaum J.’s
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and view that the appropriation of another individual’s intel-
obtaining a just reward for the creator’’. 125 Rather than lectual property should be deemed a prohibited form of
existing as a near-absolute right, as presented by Teitel- form of expression unless it can be demonstrated that
baum J., creator’s rights are of a ‘‘limited nature’’. 126 the use of the property is compatible with its function.
Third, Teitelbaum J.’s analysis is flawed in that it
Fifth, other jurisdictions have not excluded actscollapses the distinction between real property and intel-
from the protected sphere of freedom of expression onlectual property. Teitelbaum J. does so by applying prin-
the basis that they involved the use of another indi-ciples derived from real property cases to intellectual
vidual’s copyright-protected expression. In Laugh it Offproperty issues. For instance, in discussing whether the
Promotions (LIO) v. South African Breweries Interna-copyright-protected expression of another can be used in
tional (SAB), the Constitutional Court of South Africathe service of expression, Teitelbaum J. cites a real prop-
dealt with a case involving the interrelationship betweenerty case which concluded that ‘‘any person who tres-
the freedom of expression guarantee contained in sec-passes upon . . . the property of another . . . is guilty of an
tion 16(1) of the Constitution and the protection of reg-offence’’. 127 The conceptual distinction between tangible
istered trade marks in s. 34(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Actand intangible property is mentioned only briefly during
194 of 1993 (an anti-dilution provision). 135 SAB hadthe course of the decision. In discussing the nature of
brought an action against LIO to enjoin LIO from usingcopyright as private property, Teitelbaum J. notes that it
its trade mark in making t-shirts displaying a message ofis an intangible property right. However, instead of
‘‘social satire or parody’’. 136 Affirming the importance oftaking this opportunity to address the distinctions
freedom of expression, the Constitutional Court heldbetween tangible and intangible property (namely that
that the anti-dilution provisionthe copyright owner does not possess the ‘‘absolute
power of a private (real) property owner to control access
must be construed in the light of the Constitution andto and use of public intellectual property’’ 128), Teitel-
applied in a manner that does not unduly trample uponbaum J. dismisses the distinctions by stating that ‘‘just freedom of expression. This approach would necessitate the
because the right is intangible, it should not be any less weighing-up of the constitutional safeguard of free expres-
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property of the trade mark owner and where appropriate meaning. The government’s main objective in tabling
the owner’s freedoms of trade, occupation or profession. 137 legislation granting protection to TPMs is to implement
A similar balancing was carried out in the U.S.A. in the provisions of the WCT and WPPT, including those
Cardtoons , L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Associ- provisions that address TPMs. 149 TPMs seek to preclude
ation between freedom of expression and the right of infringing uses of copyright-protected expression, many
publicity. 138 In Cardtoons, an action was brought to of which attempt to convey meaning. One such example
obtain a is the parodic depiction of ‘‘Bibendum’’ in Michelin.
Thus, because the purpose of the provisions is to restrictdeclaratory judgment that [Cardtoons] parody trading cards
featuring active major league baseball players do not meaning, a s. 2(b) violation is established.
infringe on the publicity rights of the members of the Major
Though a determination that the purpose of theLeague Baseball Players Association. 139
provisions unconstitutionally restricts freedom of expres-The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated sion is dispositive of the matter, this paper will, for thethat ‘‘like trademark and copyright, the right of publicity sake of completeness, investigate whether the effects ofinvolves a cognizable property interest’’. 140 However, as the government action restrict expression. In order tothe right of publicity does not have any ‘‘built-in mecha- determine whether the provisions granting legislativenisms that serve to avoid First Amendment concerns’’, protection to TPMs restrict the claimant’s freedom ofthe right had to be balanced directly with the free speech expression in effect, the claimant must investigateguarantee. 141 whether the expressive activity at issue promoted at least
Sixth, Teitelbaum J.’s conclusion that acts that one of the three core values of freedom of expression. 150
involve the use of another individual’s intellectual prop- In the case at hand, the ‘‘expressive activities’’ at issue are
erty are prima facie prohibited forms of expression is those activities that fall within the fair dealing defence.
inconsistent with the broad approach taken by the These activities, as noted earlier, promote the core values
Supreme Court of Canada in determining whether acts of freedom of expression. By restricting the fair dealing
constitute protected forms of expression. As noted in R. defence, the provisions of Bill C-60 infringe the s. 2(b)
v. Keegstra: guarantee in effect.
Apart from rare cases where expression is communicated in
a physically violent form, the Court thus viewed the funda-
mental nature of the freedom of expression as ensuring that Section 1 analysis 
‘‘if the activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it
Section 1 of the Charter states that the rights andhas expressive content and prima facie falls within the scope
of the guarantee’’. 142 freedoms set out in the Charter are guaranteed ‘‘only to
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can beGuided by this broad and generous interpretation of
demonstrably justified in a free and democraticfreedom of expression, the Supreme Court of Canada
society’’. 151 In order to justify the infringement of thehas found that deliberate lies and falsehoods, 143 defama-
freedom of expression guarantee, the government musttory libel, 144 and possession of  child pornography145 are
demonstrate that the law meets the s. 1 test as set out inall protected forms of expression under s. 2(b). The
R. v. Oakes. 152 There are four parts to the Oakes test.breadth of these decisions suggest that fair dealing
should constitute a protected form of expression. Given First, it is asked whether the objective served by the
the above stated deficiencies, this paper takes the posi- measures limiting a Charter right is sufficiently impor-
tion that Michelin is unpersuasive and should not be tant to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected
followed. Accordingly, contrary to the approach in right or freedom.153 The objective of the provisions con-
Michelin, activities falling under the fair dealing defence cerning the protection of TPMs is to implement interna-
should not be excluded from s. 2(b) protection on the tional treaties that seek to protect authors against the
basis that they contain the copyright-protected expres- unauthorized use of their works. The ease with which
sion of another individual. dissemination occurs on the Internet renders the need to
protect authors’ content pressing and substantial. ThisHaving determined that the acts in question consti-
objective would likely qualify as sufficiently importanttute expression and that there are no special circum-
because it helps ensure authors are compensated forstances which warrant removing that expression from
their efforts. Absent protection for authors, the financialthe protected sphere under the Charter, the next step in
incentive to create diminishes, threatening a society’s cre-the freedom of expression analysis asks whether the pur-
ative output and the future of industries associated withpose or effect of the government action in question is to
copyright.restrict freedom of expression. 146 The assessment of legis-
lative purpose focuses upon the aims and objectives of Second, it must be demonstrated that the
the legislature. 147 If the government’s purpose was to impugned measures are rationally connected to the
restrict attempts to convey a meaning, there has been a objective. 154 As noted above, the objective of the provi-
limitation of s. 2(b) and a s. 1 analysis is required. 148 sions concerning the protection of TPMs is to imple-
ment international treaties that seek to protect authorsThe purpose of the provisions granting legislative


































































A Step in the Wrong Direction 191
sures enacted, granting legislative protection to TPMs, copyright legislation implementing the WCT and
seek to carry out these objectives. WPPT. It must do so in a manner consistent with the
Charter. The impugned provisions failed Charter scru-Third, the means should impair the Charter right
tiny in part because they had the effect of restricting theno more than necessary to accomplish the objective. 155
core values of freedom of expression. In order for futureThe impugned provisions in the Statement and Bill C-60
legislation regarding TPMs to survive Charter scrutiny,are intended to restrict only infringing unauthorized
the core values of freedom of expression must be pro-uses. The effect of the provisions is much broader. The
tected. This paper takes the position that in order toprovisions restrict all activities that use the expression of
survive Charter scrutiny, legislation granting protectionanother to convey meaning. Consequently, the provi-
to TPMs must contain a provision requiring copyrightsions granting protection to TPMs are overbroad, and
holders who institute TPMs to provide access to users forthus not the least drastic means of pursuing the objec-
fair dealing purposes. Article 6(4) of the ISD may act as ative. On this basis, the provisions granting legislative pro-
potential model for future legislation.tection to TPMs cannot be justified. In the interest of
completeness, this paper will investigate the fourth
branch of the Oakes test. The addition of such a provision (the fair dealing
amendment), however, might cause the legislativeFourth, there must be proportionality between the
scheme to violate Article 11 of the WCT and Article 18effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting
of the WPPT.158 Articles 11 and 18 require contractingthe Charter right or freedom, and the objective which
parties to provide ‘‘adequate legal protection’’ forhas been identified as of ‘‘sufficient importance’’. 156 The
TPMs.159 The fair dealing amendment would allow indi-impact of the impugned provisions on the user is
viduals seeking to access a work for infringing purposesprofound. TPMs lock individuals out from copyright-
to do so unimpeded through misuse of the fair dealingprotected expression, effectively preventing them from
exception. Thus, the fair dealing amendment may renderexercising their fair dealing rights. As discussed in Part II,
TPMs ineffective, and Canada’s legal protection for TPMsthe denial of fair dealing rights impoverishes the core
inadequate. The predicament that arises should Canadavalues of freedom of expression, namely participation in
choose to ratify the WCT and WPPT is two-fold. Ifdemocratic dialogue, the search for truth, and self-fulfill-
Canada does not implement the fair dealing amend-ment. The objective of protecting authors would not, in
ment, then, based on the above analysis, it will violateall probability, outweigh the deleterious effects to users’
the freedom of expression rights of its citizens. If Canadafreedom of expression rights. Thus, the effects of the
does implement the fair dealing amendment, it may beimpugned provisions are disproportionate to the objec-
found to be in violation of Articles 11 and 18 of thetive.
WCT and WPPT.
Remedy 
However, the likelihood that the fair dealingThe legislative protection of TPMs infringes the
amendment would violate Articles 11 and 18 must beright to freedom of expression guaranteed in s. 2(b) of
examined in more detail. Under the WCT and WPPT,the Charter, and cannot be justified through a s. 1 anal-
contracting parties need not provide protection againstysis. Thus, the legislation is inconsistent with the Charter.
the circumvention of all TPMs. Articles 11 and 18Subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867 states
require contracting parties only to provide ‘‘adequatethat:
legal protection’’ against the circumvention of TPMsThe Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, used by authors/performers in connection with the exer-and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the
cise of their rights under the WCT, WPPT or the BerneConstitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no
force or effect. 157 Convention, and that restrict acts which are not author-
ized or permitted by law.160 The reach of TPMs currentlyAt this point, the legislature may either abandon the
extends far beyond this limited scope. As noted above,legislation or rewrite the impugned provisions in a
one of the main criticisms of TPMs is that they are notmanner consistent with the Charter. A possible
technologically sophisticated enough to distinguish‘‘rewriting’’ of the impugned provisions is discussed in
infringing uses from non-infringing uses. 161 They restrictPart V.
both acts prohibited by law and those permitted by law.
Furthermore, TPMs are currently used by authors to pro-
tect both existing rights and rights which do not existPart V: Treaty Implications under copyright legislation, such as an exclusive right to
iven the discussion in Part I regarding the conse- control access to a work. It is assumed that if WIPO hadG quences of Canada’s failure to implement the intended to require contracting parties to provide protec-
WCT and WPPT and its commitment to do so, it is tion for all TPMs, then it would have drafted Articles 11
doubtful that the Canadian government will choose to and 18 to reflect this intention. The presence of limita-
abandon its goal of implementing legislation protecting tions in Articles 11 and 18 indicates that WIPO wished
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Thus, even if the effect of altering legislation pro- TPMs impoverish the core values of freedom of expres-
tecting TPMs to include a right to access TPM-protected sion. In order for legislation implementing TPMs to sur-
works for fair dealing purposes causes the legal protec- vive Charter scrutiny, it must contain a provision
tion of TPMs in Canada to become inadequate, it would requiring copyright holders who institute TPMs to pro-
not breach the WCT or WPPT. Rather, the addition of a vide access to users for fair dealing purposes. Such a
right to access TPM-protected works for fair dealing pur- provision, though it may render TPMs ineffective, would
poses would merely help bring what are now over- not cause Canada to breach its treaty obligations. In
reaching technological mechanisms closer into con- sanctioning TPMs without providing a right for users to
formity with the standards as set out in the WCT and access copyright-protected works for fair dealing pur-
WPPT. The threat of breaching treaty obligations should poses, the Canadian government is sanctioning the
not deter the Canadian government from including a impoverishment of democratic dialogue, the search for
provision guaranteeing access to TPM-protected expres- truth, and self-fulfillment, ‘‘principle[s] of vital impor-
sion for fair dealing purposes in any legislation granting tance in a free and democratic society’’. 162 As Iacobucci J.
protection to TPMs. noted in Irwin Toy:
Our concern should be to recognize that in this century we
have seen whole societies utterly corrupted by the suppres-
sion of free expression. We should not lightly take a step inConclusion 
that direction, even a small one. 163
his paper takes the position that the legislative pro-T tection of TPMs infringes the s. 2(b) guarantee of The enactment of legislative protection for TPMs, absent
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and a corresponding right of access for users to exercise their
cannot be justified through a s. 1 analysis. TPMs preclude right to fair dealing, leads to the suppression of free
users from exercising their right to fair dealing. Fair expression. In attempting to respond to the challenges
dealing promotes and protects the core values of posed by digital technologies to the exclusive rights of
freedom of expression in the copyright context. By pre- copyright holders, the Canadian government must not
cluding users from exercising their right to fair dealing, take a step in this direction.
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